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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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073189
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1990-09-17
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NATION, Page 18The Stealth Takes WingBut its price and uncertain role may shoot the B-2 downBy Bruce Van Voorst
The B-2 Stealth bomber is designed to be virtually undetectable
by enemy radar, but never in history was an aircraft's first flight
more visible. Before scores of television cameras and thousands of
spectators, the bat-shaped flying wing lifted into the sunrise at
Palmdale, Calif., last week for a 106-minute, slow-speed,
wheels-down flight.
But even at the moment of its apparent success, the
technologically revolutionary bomber faced a threat to its
existence, not from hostile radar and missiles but from a newly
skeptical Congress that has become increasingly alarmed over the
plane's horrendous cost. By the Air Force's own calculations, each
of the 132 B-2s it wants will cost more than $530 million, a total
of $70.2 billion over the next decade. Already $23 billion has been
spent on research and development. How, Congressmen wonder, can the
most expensive weapons system ever built be reconciled with a
shrinking defense budget?
The Air Force's estimate of the B-2's price tag, gargantuan as
it is, may be far too low. In an exchange with Air Force Chief of
Staff Larry Welch, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les
Aspin warned that Congress would never go along with the Air
Force's plan to spend $8 billion annually -- more than twice the
current SDI budget -- on the Stealth. At the more likely spending
rate of $3 billion a year, said Aspin, the sticker price would soar
to more than $1 billion for each plane.
Many Republicans not only agree with Aspin but are leading the
assault on the Stealth. Says the committee's ranking Republican
member, William Dickinson of Alabama: "The B-2 program is in a lot
of trouble, not for technical reasons but simply by price tag."
Declares Ohio Congressman John Kasich: "Nobody's pushed harder for
the (Secretary of Defense Dick) Cheney defense budget than I, but
America cannot afford the B-2." To South Carolina Republican Arthur
Ravenel Jr., cancellation of the B-2 is inevitable, "just like
death and taxes."
Until much more testing is completed, the debate cannot answer
a very basic question: Is the B-2 capable of attacking targets in
the Soviet Union without being detected? The initial flight proved
only that the boomerang-shaped delta wing can fly. It remains to
be seen whether the sleek aerodynamic design, composite-plastics
fabrication and other tricks intended to evade radar will actually
work.
Nor is there agreement on the strategic justification for the
bomber. Cheney argues that the Stealth is needed to maintain "the
effectiveness of the bomber leg of the strategic triad," the mix
of land- and sea-based missiles and nuclear weapons carried by
aircraft on which U.S. deterrence has been based. Welch contends
that bombers are regarded by both the U.S. and the Soviets as "the
most stabilizing element of the triad." Unlike missiles that can
strike in 30 minutes or less, bombers need hours to reach their
targets and hence do not represent a first-strike threat against
the Soviets. Moreover, because they can take off and fly to safety
when threatened, they can survive a Soviet attack.
Even conceding that bombers are stabilizing, however, does not
clinch the case for the B-2. There are other, cheaper ways of
achieving the goal. The Pentagon has just spent $28 billion to
acquire 100 B-1 bombers, which despite all their failures should
be capable of penetrating Soviet airspace for many years.
Critics contend that the Air Force has failed to define a
realistic mission for the B-2. The traditional wartime assignment
would be for the bombers to join a missile attack on such fixed
targets in the Soviet Union as missile silos and command centers.
In addition, the Air Force for a time suggested, the B-2 could
locate and destroy a more elusive class of targets: new Soviet
mobile missiles. But that now seems technically improbable. The Air
Force has also proposed using the B-2 to carry conventional weapons
to Third World targets such as Libya, a notion widely rejected as
unnecessarily expensive.
Perhaps the most potent challenge to the B-2 comes from those
who argue that in the missile age, there is no reason for a manned
aircraft to penetrate Soviet air defenses. New "standoff"
air-launched cruise missiles, with great range, extraordinary
accuracy and the ability to evade detection by radar, could be
fired from outside the Soviet Union by the existing fleet of
B-52Gs.
The fate of the B-2 will be the centerpiece of the
military-budget debate in Congress this week. Cheney earlier agreed
to cut $1 billion from the B-2s in the 1990 budget. But both the
Senate and House Armed Services committees made further cuts, and
amendments will be offered on the floor to suspend production or
terminate the program. Last week the President and the Pentagon
upped the ante, warning that unless the B-2 is built, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff might oppose a new strategic arms reduction pact
with the Soviets. Colorado democratic Senator Tim Wirth called it
a "very high-stakes poker game." Indeed it was.